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Abstract
Improving external relations and the management of development aid is a key
component of the current reform of the European Union (EU). In the course of
the 1990s, the promotion of democracy, the strengthening of good governance
and enhancing the rule of law progressively became both an  objective and a
condition for the EU development assistance with developing countries.
Achieving these sometimes-contradictory goals in practice is a permanent
challenge. This paper reviews the EU’s policies and strategies aimed at
preventing conflict and responding to the crises of governance. It explores the
difficult combination of democracy assistance and governance conditionality
and its applicability to the prevention of democratic erosion in developing
countries. While the EU mainly relies on a positive approach of support and
inducement, it has also introduced, since 1995, provisions to suspend aid in the
event of a sudden and persistent interruption of the democratisation process. The
suspension mechanism enshrined in the cooperation agreement between the EU
and ACP countries has made political dialogue the main strategic tool for
achieving these varied purposes. Mainstreaming political dialogue into the
cooperation forces the EC to focus more explicitly and more rigorously on
issues of power, politics and democracy than it has done in the past.
Governance conditionality constitutes a critical juncture between democracy
promotion and conflict prevention strategies. The article is organised in three
substantive sections. It successively addresses the policy, strategy and
implementation dilemmas of EC democracy and governance activities in third
countries, reviewing the policy responses of the EC to the crises of governance
in Niger, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and Fiji. It argues that conducting structured
political dialogue puts further demands on the management of aid. While
punitive forms of political conditionality have proved largely ineffective, an
incentive-based approach to governance conditionality could yield, if well
managed, greater results. The article concludes with a series of proposals for
enhancing the European Commission’s ability to manage political dialogue and
governance conditionality to encourage democracy and prevent conflict.
* * Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University in
Washington, D.C.1
THE REFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY
IMPROVING STRATEGIES FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION,
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION & GOVERNANCE CONDITIONALITY
CARLOS SANTISO
The gods had condemned Sisyphus to ceaselessly rolling a rock to
the top of a mountain, whence the stone would fall back of its own
weight. They had thought with some reason that there is no more
dreadful punishment than futile and hopeless labour.
Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, 1942
1. Introduction: The Challenges of Reform
The European Union (EU) stands at a crossroads, a defining juncture in its
history as it launches the single currency and prepares for enlargement. At
the same time, the EU faces multifaceted challenges to ‘reinvent’ itself. In
recent years, great expectations have been raised on the reform of
European governance. At the recent European Council held in Laeken,
Belgium, in December 2001, European leaders renewed their commitment
to re-energise the EU and decided to convene a Convention on the Future
of Europe in March 2002, chaired by former French president Valéry
Giscard d’Estaing.
Improving the management of external aid is a key component of the
reform of the European Commission initiated in 1998 and made a priority
in the wake of the 1999 crisis. At the global level, the reform of the foreign
aid managed by the European Community (EC) provides a critical
opportunity to re-equilibrate the global aid regime by strengthening the
coherence of European international development cooperation. The main
innovation of the current overhaul of EC development assistance resides in
its ambition to articulate coherent aid policies, set consistent strategies and
establish more efficient management structures. It is argued that the
reforms engaged may signal a re-foundation of EC aid policy and in
particular its efforts to promote democratic governance and the rule of law
abroad. Nevertheless, the current revamping of external relations and
foreign aid presents the EU with daunting challenges. The reform process
is beset with both promises and dilemmas: can the Sisyphean tasks of
promoting democratic governance and the rule of law in politically fragile
countries and dysfunctional states be reconciled with the inner workings of
a bureaucracy with a procedure-driven ethos?CARLOS S ANTISO
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The period from 2002 to 2004 is likely to be a time of sweeping reforms,
which, if well designed and managed, could yield major results. This
article sets out to assess the thrust, direction and scope of the current
reform of EC aid policies, strategies and structures, as it pertains to the
efforts of the EC to encourage democracy, strengthen good governance and
prevent violent conflict in developing countries. It focuses on the
controversial recourse to governance conditionality and aid selectivity to
increase the effectiveness of aid.
In the course of the 1990s, the promotion of democracy, the strengthening
of good governance and the enhancement of the rule of law have
progressively become both an  objective and a  condition for the EU
development assistance with developing countries (Burnell 1994, 2000;
Whitehead 1996; Diamond 1997; Carothers 1999; Crawford 2001, 2000a
and b; Santiso 1999 and 2001a; Youngs 2001; Schraeder 2002). As recent
events in Zambia and Zimbabwe show, achieving these (sometimes
contradictory) twin goals in practice is such a permanent challenge that it
has often been described as the Sisyphean task of ‘ceaselessly rolling a
rock to the top of a mountain.’ Furthermore, preventing conflict, impeding
the corrosion of governance and responding to the erosion of democracy
represent even more daunting tasks for aid policies. While the debate over
the kinds of strategies best able to encourage democratisation in the
developing world has made significant progress, the prevention of
democratic regressions has become a pressing concern for the international
community. The 1990s were marked by recurrent crises of democratic
governance, which destabilised politically fragile countries. The question
then becomes how to promote democratic governance and the rule of law
in ‘poor performing’ countries, hollow democracies and semi-authoritarian
regimes such as Zimbabwe.
The cooperation framework between the EU and 77 countries in Africa, the
Caribbean and the Pacific (the so-called ACP group), which is often
depicted as a model of development partnership, serves as the main
reference framework for this study. Along with the thorny issues related to
trade, the political dimensions of the EU-ACP cooperation were amongst
the most contentious issues during the negotiations leading to the adoption
of the Cotonou Convention in June 2000, which now regulates EU
development cooperation with ACP countries. Political dialogue has
become the main instrument for promoting democratic governance and
preventing conflict in democratic-backsliders such as Haiti, Fiji, Kenya,
Guinea-Bissau, Zambia or Zimbabwe. However, the current reformTHE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
3
proposals tend to focus more on improving the management of aid, than
enhancing its ultimate effectiveness. More fundamentally, they only
tangentially address the central ‘question of strategy’ (Carothers 1997a)
and in particular how political dialogue should be conducted and structured
in practice, including, inter alia, what are the procedures framing it and
how the indicators of governance performance will be defined and
monitored.
The current debate on mainstreaming of political dialogue into the
cooperation is further hampered by the lack of comprehensive review of
how political dialogue has been conducted in the past, especially since the
adoption of the revised fourth Convention of Lomé in 1995. As the cases
reviewed in this study show, the key challenges reside in the
implementation phase. The working paper argues that the European
Commission remains ill equipped to conduct structured political dialogue
with its development partners in the context of the newly proclaimed
development partnerships. It tends to follow the leadership of the
international financial institutions (IFIs) in the context of the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) process. This tendency is particularly
problematic as far as the political aspects of the cooperation are concerned
and could undermine the identity of EC development cooperation.
This working paper reviews the policies and strategies aimed at preventing
conflict and responding to the crises of governance in the current context
of the overhaul of EC development aid. It explores the difficult
combination of democracy assistance and governance conditionality and
its applicability to the prevention of democratic regression and governance
erosion in developing countries. It scrutinises in particular EU cooperation
with countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), which has
made political dialogue the main strategic tool for achieving the varied
purposes of EC aid. While the EC mainly relies on a positive approach of
support and inducement, it has also introduced, since 1995, provisions to
suspend aid in the event of a sudden and persistent interruption of the
democratisation process. However, mainstreaming political dialogue in
development cooperation will force the EC to focus more explicitly and
more rigorously on issues of power, politics and democracy than it has
done in the past. Combining structured political dialogue, democracy
assistance and governance conditionality presents the EC with
multifaceted dilemmas.
The working paper is organised in three substantive sections. It
successively addresses the policy, strategy and implementation dilemmasCARLOS S ANTISO
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of EC democracy promotion activities. The first section scrutinises the
mainstreaming of democracy and governance assistance strategies in the
context of the current reform of the EC aid apparatus. The second section
focuses more narrowly on the difficult combination of democracy
assistance and governance conditionality. The last section compares and
contrasts the responses of the EU to crises of governance and regressions
of democracy in four case studies: Niger, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and Fiji in
the context of the cooperation between the EU and ACP countries.
1
We argue that conducting political dialogue in a structured and consistent
manner puts further demands on the political management of aid.
However, current reforms tend to emphasise the technical dimensions of
aid effectiveness, paying less attention to political and strategic
considerations. More fundamentally, punitive political conditionality is an
inadequate strategy to respond to democratic regressions and crises of
governance. However, new forms of ‘positive’ conditionality, relying on
incentive mechanisms and aid selectivity, offer greater promises, if
appropriately managed. Democracy assistance and governance
conditionality could prove mutually reinforcing strategies to strengthen
democratisation and prevent conflict by modifying the incentive structure
faced by partner countries. We conclude by articulating a series of
proposals for improving the Commission’s ability to manage political
dialogue. We suggest ways in which the Commission could strengthen its
strategic planning, policy research and evaluation capacities in the field of
democracy and governance.
This working paper is rooted in the belief that external democracy
promotion can and does have a decisive influence on the fragile processes
of democratisation in developing countries. Promoting democracy,
strengthening good governance and preventing violent conflict is a
Sisyphean task, both for international donors collectively but even more
for each one of them taken individually. However, it is not a ‘futile and
hopeless labour’.
                                                                
1 We do not examine the cases where the outbreak of conflict has made aid impossible,
thus de facto suspending it (such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi), neither those ‘rogue states’ were sanctions and
strategic isolation have been applied under the EU’s foreign policy provisions (such as
Libya, Iraq, the former Republic of Yugoslavia, and North Korea).THE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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2. Encouraging Democracy and Strengthening Governance: Policy
Dilemmas
The Limits of the Technocratic Approach
The EU’s efforts to promote democracy and strengthen good governance in
developing countries have been criticised for their lack of coherence,
consistency and effectiveness, most recently by the European Court of
Auditors (Comité des Sages 1998; Court of Justice 1998; Court of Auditors
2000a and b; Olsen 2002). The technocratic consensus impregnating EC
aid and the opacity of its bureaucratic procedures have obliged the EC to
address political problems with technical solutions in the straightjacket of
complex decision-making processes and intricate management procedures.
An opaque administrative labyrinth, a technocratic approach to the
management of aid and burdensome ex-ante financial controls compound
the absence of an overarching democracy assistance strategy.
The Commission has often been criticised for its bureaucratic management
of resources, as strategies have tended to be guided by instruments rather
than by policy objectives. In its conclusions of May 1999, the
Development Council noted that ‘the organisational fragmentation of
development cooperation within the Commission causes difficulties for
coherent and integrated Community development cooperation’. The
exasperation with the failure of the Commission to reform its development
aid effectively was expressed in 2000 by the International Development
Committee of Britain’s House of Commons in its ninth report on the
effectiveness of EC development assistance and bluntly voiced by Clare
Short, Britain’s Secretary of State for International Development, in June
2000: ‘the Commission is the worst development agency in the world. The
poor quality and reputation of its aid brings Europe into disrepute’.
2
The geographically compartmentalised structure of aid management has
led to a splintered policy framework. Thus, as many observers have
argued, ‘the organisational framework has appeared to influence policy,
rather than the opposite’ (OECD DAC 1998:12). The proliferation of
budget lines and ad hoc regulations has hampered the definition of sector-
wide strategies and adversely affected the coordination of EC democracy
and governance promotion efforts. Beyond the broad guidelines provided
by the four successive treaties, EC’s aid policies applicable to any given
sector or geographical area are made of a thicket of regulations,
                                                                
2 ‘Aid that Doesn’t Help’, Financial Times, 23 June 2000.CARLOS S ANTISO
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resolutions, declarations, and communications, often lacking an
overarching policy purpose and strategic thrust.
By the end of 1999, bureaucratic inefficiencies had reached tremendous
proportions. The backlog of outstanding commitments reached over €20
billion and the average delay in disbursement of committed funds had
increased from 3 years in 1994 to 4.5 years in 1999. In some cases, delays
between commitment and disbursement surpassed 8.5 years (MEDA 8.75
years, Asia 7 years and Latin America 6.5 years) (EC 2000d). Unclear and
divided responsibilities, chronic staff shortages and complex administrative
procedures were mainly responsible for these delays and the resulting
deficient management of aid programmes. The credibility of EC foreign
aid was thus at stake. By that time, however, the crisis had affected the
legitimacy of the Commission itself. In March 1999, the Santer
Commission resigned  en masse over allegations of corruption and
mismanagement and the reform of European governance became the
priority of the successor Commission.
The new Commission headed by Romano Prodi came into office in
September 1999 with a clear mandate to modernise the Commission and
streamline the management of the institution. The 2000 White Paper on
Reforming the Commission and the 2001 White Paper on  European
Governance provide critical assessments of the root causes of the EC crisis
of legitimacy and credibility (EC 2000e and 2001c). They address, with
unusual honesty and ingenuity, the key deficiencies of the Commission
bureaucratic ethos and underline the urgency to reform the modes of
governance within the Commission itself. The revamping of external
relations and the management of aid occupies a critical place in the reform
efforts (Bossuyt et al. 2000).
In many respects, the EC can be depicted using the metaphor of the Castle
described by Franz Kakfa in his 1922 novel, representing the archetype of
bureaucratic opacity and technocratic strabismus. While its financial
assistance is often sought by developing countries, its contribution to the
debate on international development has remained abstruse. As a result,
and although the EU is a major contributor to official development
assistance, it has remained a political dwarf in the global aid regime. In
particular, the aid directly managed by the Commission has often lacked
identity and effectiveness, the EC being perceived more as a funding
agency than a development partner with clearly demarcated aid strategies.
Its political influence continues to be disproportionate in relation to its
financial might.THE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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This lack of coherence weakens the EC’s leverage in the global aid regime.
The EC could play a central role in global governance but fails to do so as
it is consumed by internal matters linked to the management of the aid it
provides. The development agenda continues to be set by the international
financial institutions (IFIs) in which the EU’s voice remains fragmented. In
particular, the World Bank has significantly shaped development thinking
in the course of the 1990s and has progressively ‘acquired a quasi-
monopoly on institutional knowledge in the field of economic
development’ (Hiboux 2000:3). The EC has largely remained a follower in
these debates. Its member states share the blame for this state of affairs by
not allowing the Commission to acquire the means of its ambitions.
Indeed, the harmonisation or, at least, the consistency between EC and EU
member states aid policies has been a permanent source of concern and
friction.
Reforming Development Assistance
Concerns about the quality and effectiveness of EC development
assistance are not new and the EC has actively sought to address its
management shortcomings. In June 1995, the Development Council
requested the Commission to undertake a series of evaluations of its
external aid programmes, covering aid policies towards Africa, the
Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP countries), the Mediterranean (MEDA),
Asia and Latin America (ALA) and humanitarian assistance.
3 In May
1999, in the context of the wider reform of the European Commission and
on the basis of these evaluations, the Development Council called for an
‘integrated and strategic up-to-date statement on development policy’ and
emphasised the importance of translating policy objectives into concrete
operational strategies.
In November 2000, the Council and the Commission adopted a joint
statement to clarify the strategic thrust of the EC development policy
which stated that while poverty reduction is the main objective of EC
development cooperation, it will only be sustained where there are
functioning democracies and accountable government (CEU 2001). The
promotion of democratic institutions, good governance and the rule of law
are one of the six priority areas identified by the EC development policy.
This policy statement, together with the reform of the management of
external assistance currently underway, represents the new framework for
EC democracy assistance. In a communication in May 2001, the
                                                                
3 Global evaluations reports ACP(951338), ALA(951401), and MED(951495).CARLOS S ANTISO
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Commission made administrative reform a critical dimension of its efforts
to enhance the effectiveness of aid, with the reunification of the project
cycle management under an autonomous implementing agency, the
Europe Aid Cooperation Office (replacing the  Common Service for
External Relations, SCR, established in 1998), the adoption of multi-
annual programming, and the deconcentration of responsibilities toward
the delegations in the field. The ultimate objective is to enhance the
efficiency of the management of aid and speed up disbursements.
4
Until recently, the EC lacked common country strategies guiding its
interventions in any particular country (OECD DAC 1998; Court of
Auditors 2000a and b). To remedy this shortcoming, the EC adopted a
common  Community Cooperation Framework in May 2000 providing a
strategic basis for coordination and consistency.
5 This framework
mandates the EC to establish consolidated Country Support Strategies
(CSS) for ACP countries and Common Strategy Papers (CSP) for other
partner countries. These country papers must include a systematic review
of the governance environment. The ability and capacity of EC delegations
will be critical to translate general policy objectives into concrete
operational strategies. The key question is then whether EC delegations
will be given the appropriate analytical tools to comprehend the political
economy of democratisation and whether they will be endowed with the
sufficient in-house expertise to articulate efficacious democracy assistance
interventions.
In that respect, it has been suggested to establish a specialised institution
linked to the Commission to advise it on how to implement political
dialogue and design democracy assistance programmes. The European
Councils in Vienna in December 1998 and Cologne in June 1999
suggested the establishment of an autonomous  European Agency for
Human Rights and Democracy. However, this option was discarded in
2001 by the Commission which believed that ‘establishing a separate
agency outside the Europe Aid Cooperation Office to support human rights
                                                                
4 By September 2001, the level of budgetary commitments made prior to 1995 had
been reduced by 52% compared to November 1999 (when this process began), a
reduction of some €500 million. Moreover, by June 2001 the level of dormant
commitments had been reduced to €986 million (compared to €1.3 billion by the end
of December 1999 and €1350 million by the end of December 2000). EDF
commitments made prior to 1995 were also reduced from €901 million in 1999 to
€593 million by the middle of this year.
5 SEC(2000)1049.THE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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and democratisation in third countries would undermine the [European
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights’] essential purpose as a
complement to the main EC assistance programmes and a support to the
EU’s specific CFSP objectives’ (EC 2001a:20). However, the Commission
has not proposed an alternative set-up. The Europe Aid Cooperation Office
proposed in 1998 as part of the reform of EC foreign aid became
operational in January 2001. However, its internal structure remains
dominated by geographically compartmentalised units. As a result, there
does not yet exist a Commission-wide institutional structure to act as a
focal point for devising Commission-wide policies on democracy
assistance and governance conditionality. At the policy level, this function
remains splintered among various directorate-generals (external relations,
enlargement, and development), although the current reforms appear to
concede the central role to the external relations directorate.
Financing Democracy Assistance
What has begun as a series of scattered initiatives in the late 1980s and
early 1990s has gradually become a more systematic endeavour. In
financial terms, the EU contribution to development assistance is
significant. The EC and the EU member states combined are the largest
providers of official development assistance (ODA), mainly in grant form,
representing some 55% of total ODA. In 2000, the EC alone provided $US
4.9 billion (8.5% of total ODA), representing a 13% increase from 1999,
while the EU countries combined provided $US 25.4 billion volume (44%
of total ODA). The EC has become the fourth provider of ODA in volume
in 2000. The EU (EC and Member States) is the second largest among
multilateral donor, after the International Development Association (IDA)
of the World Bank.
According to the recent review by the Development Assistance Committee
(OECD DAC 1999), EC ODA has continued to grow over an extended
period, both in relative and absolute terms, in a time when many other
programmes have declined.
6 Over the past decade the EC aid has grown
faster than other DAC member development cooperation programmes
because EU member states have agreed to channel a growing share of their
aid budgets through the EU. In 1970 EU member states were channelling 7
                                                                
6 Over the last five years EC development cooperation grew at an average annual rate
of 3.3% while the combined effort of DAC countries declined by 4.7% annually
(OECD DAC 1998).CARLOS S ANTISO
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percent of their aid through the EU. By 1990 it was up to 13% and in 1997
it was over 17%.
EC foreign aid programme combines characteristics of a bilateral donor
and of a multilateral institution, which makes it unique among
development cooperation organisations. The EC has the financial
responsibility for almost 10% of total ODA, an increased from 5 percent in
1985. It is also the largest donor of humanitarian aid. Total external aid
commitments climbed from €3.3 billion in 1990 to €8.6 billion in 1999.
The EC is directly responsible for five development cooperation
programmes with countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP),
Latin America and Asia (ALA), the Mediterranean (MEDA), East and
Central Asia (Tacis), and the Western Balkans. Each regional cooperation
framework is under the supervision of a specific committee of the
European Council of Ministers (Development). The EC’s external
assistance programmes total some €5 billion per annum, in addition to the
European Development Fund (EDF) resources for ACP countries (€13.5
billion under the 9
th EDF covering the period between 2000 and 2007).
In financial terms, the EU contribution to the promotion of democracy and
the strengthening of governance in developing countries and transitional
economies is significant. Democracy assistance, defined narrowly as
encompassing ‘aid specifically designed to foster opening in a non-
democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that
has experienced a democratic opening’ (Carothers 1999:6), takes mainly
the form of ‘positive measures’ of support and inducement.
The two main sources of financing for democracy assistance are the
chapter B7-70 of the EC budget and the EDF for ACP countries. As tables
1 and 2 show, direct support for governance and civil society rose from an
annual average of €130 million a year for 1991-95 (less tha n 2 percent of
total EC aid) to almost €550 million a year for 1996-98, representing over
7 percent of total EC aid (Cox and Chapman 1999). This increase is due, in
particular, to the substantial increase of EC aid to Central and Eastern
Europe. Between 1988 and 1998, EC democracy and governance
assistance totalled almost €2.4 billion.THE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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Table 1. Regional Distribution of Democracy and Civil Society Assistance,
1988-98 (commitments, million €)
 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1988-
1998
Africa Caribbean Pacific (ACP) 7 8 28 19 41 22 10 31 78 175 86 505
Mediterranean and Middle East 0 1 32 14 8 52 78 25 210
Asia and Latin America 5 10 10 15 14 21 32 27 16 150
Central and Eastern Europe 10 27 26 66 82 26 212 221 271 941
Newly Independent States 6 24 30 42 40 24 31 35 232
Sub-total regional 43 62 102 165 162 126 398 532 433 2,023
EIDHR * 106 80 92 367
Total 17 12 53 58 120 165 207 117 504 612 525 2,390
* EIDHR expenditure between 1996 and 1998 is obtained by subtracting the sub-total regional expenditure from
the total expenditure.
Source: Cox and Chapman 1999.
Table 2. Regional Distribution of Democracy and Civil Society Assistance
1988-98 (commitments, as percent of total regional expenditure)
  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Africa Caribbean Pacific
(ACP) 0.2 0.4 2 0.9 1.5 0.8 0.3 1.2 4 15.5 3
Mediterranean and Middle
East 0.1 4.4 1.9 0.9 4.4 5 1.8
Asia and Latin America 2.3 3.5 3 3.8 3.5 4.3 6.3 5.3 3.2
Central and Eastern Europe 1.5 3.1 2.1 4.3 6.4 1.8 13.1 14.4 17
Newly Independent States 5.6 1.4 8.6 1.2 2.5 4.7 0.8
Average         2.5 2.9 4.1 1.9 6.1 9.0 5.2
Of total EC aid expenditure 0.4 0.4 1.6 1 1.8 2.4 2.8 1.6 7 9.4 6.1
Source: Cox and Chapman 1999.
In 1994, the European Parliament launched the European Initiative for
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) to bring a series of budget
headings specifically designed to promote human rights and democratic
governance together in a single budget line (chapter B7-70). The EIDHR
was extended in 2000. Between 1996 and 1999, over €300 million were
allocated to the initiative and, for financial year 2000, a further €100
million were committed. EIDHR resources are dispersed at the discretion
of the Commission. Two recent reports (EC 2000a and 2001a) describe the
wide variety of projects undertaken under this initiative, classifying them
into four broad areas: democratisation and the rule of law; pluralist civilCARLOS S ANTISO
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society; confidence building to restore peace; and initiatives for target
groups.
The sectoral distribution of EC aid reveals a preference for supporting civil
society. As Table 3 and Figure 1 show, the bulk of EIDHR resources
between 1996 and 2000 were concentrated on human rights and civil
society assistance (38%, peaking to 52% in 1999), reflecting the EC’s
preference for a ‘bottom-up’ approach to the promotion of democratic
governance. As Richard Youngs notes (2001:6), ‘the most striking feature
of EU political aid was a marked preference for funding NGOs. By the end
of the decade [of the 1990s], in most areas over 90% of democracy and
human rights expenditure went to advocacy NGOs’. If the initiatives to
targeted groups such as women, national minorities indigenous peoples or
refugees are added, the total resources dedicated to non-state actors surpass
60% of total commitments for 1996-2000.
While the share of electoral observation and assistance has declined from
its peak in the early 1990s, assistance to the institutional dimensions of
democratisation (20%) and conflict prevention (11%) represent about a
third of EIDHR commitments during that period. While the rule of law and
judicial reform are receiving increasing funding, support to parliamentary
reform is practically non-existent and the resources invested in conflict
prevention and peace-building remain insufficient. Strengthening
parliaments and executive-legislative relations in the context of complex
multiparty systems is a major challenge that has not yet received sufficient
and sustained attention from the aid community. As ownership is
increasingly emphasised as a main determinant of aid effectiveness, it is
expected that national parliaments in democratic states should become
more actively involved in the definition of poverty reduction strategies.
In order to enhance the effectiveness and impact of EIDHR programmes,
the Commission recommended the adoption of a more strategic approach
for the use of EIDHR resources (EC 2001a). It identifies several strategic
objectives focusing on capacity-building, institutional strengthening and
the rule of law, as well as a more coherent approach centring on critical
thematic priorities, and ‘focus countries’, while allowing flexibility to
respond to urgent and unforeseen needs. This appears to reflect a gradual,
albeit tentative, shift in thinking about democracy promotion and
governance reform, moving away from an exclusive focus on civil society
to a more explicit attention to the reform of the state and the strengthening
of the rule of law.THE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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Table 3. European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
Sectoral Distribution, 1996-2000 (commitments, in million €)
  1996-2000 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Democratisation and the rule of law 79.86 14.94 19.31 12.03 15.33 18.25
in percentage 19.73% 19.65% 25.40% 18.84% 16.75% 18.76%
of which:
legal assistance for civil and political rights 6.38 0.74 1.11 0.32 2.79 1.42
legal system, the judiciary and capital punishment 30.74 7.25 7.54 4.68 8.74 2.53
democratic transitions and elections 20.35 2.70 3.10 4.20 3.00 7.35
public bodies and the defence of human rights 9.00 1.04 3.05 0.50          - 4.41
Parliamentary support 6.74 0.97 1.92 1.40 0.22 2.23
transparency of public administration 6.65 2.24 2.59 0.93 0.58 0.31
Pluralist civil society 156.00 23.55 24.97 17.28 47.64 42.56
in percentage 38.55% 30.97% 32.83% 27.07% 52.06% 43.74%
of which:
human rights education and public awareness 59.77 10.65 13.15 5.89 22.98 7.10
equal opportunity and non-discrimination 13.23 0.16 0.57 0.31 7.19 5.00
freedom of expression and the media 28.54 4.33 4.65 6.05 9.70 3.81
non-governmental organisations 54.46 8.41 6.60 5.03 7.77 26.65
Confidence-building to restore peace 45.58 14.8 10.6 7.59 9.15 3.44
in percentage 11.26% 19.47% 13.94% 11.89% 9.99% 2.51%
of which
conflict prevention and resolution 16.34 2.85 3.52 3.76 5.09 1.12
human rights monitoring 12.45 7.72 3.27 0.31 0.85 0.30
international criminal justice 14.57 3.26 3.30 2.79 3.20 2.02
subordination of armed forces to civil authorities 2.21 0.97 0.51 0.73          -          -
Initiatives for target groups 90.32 15.72 14.15 19.92 12.37 28.16
in percentage 22.32% 20.68% 18.60% 31.20% 13.52% 28.94%
Procedural aspects * 32.93 7.01 7.01 7.01 7.01 4.89
in percentage 8.14% 9.23% 9.22% 10.99% 7.67% 5.03%
TOTAL 404.69 76.02 76.04 63.83 91.50 97.30
* The yearly breakdown of procedural aspects and technical assistance is not available for 1996-99. The
estimated annual procedural spending for that period has been computed as the average of the aggregate
procedural spending over the four-year period. For 2000, the figure for technical assistance was used.
Sources: EC 2000a and 2001a.CARLOS S ANTISO
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Figure 1. European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
Sectoral Distribution, 1996-2000 (commitments, in percentage)
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In regional terms, the bulk of EC democracy and governance assistance has
been directed at Central and Eastern Europe and ACP countries (see Tables
1 and 2). In the ACP countries, democracy assistance programmes were
almost non-existed at the end of the 1980s. Between 1990 and 1998, they
amounted to €491 million. In 1997 they represented €175 million or 15.5%
of total commitments (Cox and Chapman 1999:53). In Latin America,
allocations to democracy and governance assistance rose steadily in the
course of the 1990s, rising to 5% of total commitments in 1996-98.
However, in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Asia, allocations to
democracy assistance programmes remain modest considering the
challenges at hand (Youngs 2001, and forthcoming).
EIDHR resources appear evenly distributed, with a focus on ACP
developing countries, the emerging economies of East and Central Europe,
the Balkans and the CIS, and Latin American restored democracies (Table
4 and Figure 2).THE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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Table 4. European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
Regional Distribution 2000 (commitments)
  in million € in percentage
Worldwide 11.68 12%
ACP 23.35 24%
MEDA 10.70 11%
Latin America 18.49 19%
Asia 9.73 10%
East and Central Europe, Balkans, and CIS 23.35 24%
TOTAL 97.30 100%
Figure 2. European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
Regional Distribution, 2000
Worldwide
ACP
MEDA Latin America
Asia
East and 
Central 
Europe, 
Balkans and 
CIS
Regulating Democracy Assistance
The legal basis for democracy assistance has progressively solidified,
being introduced in primary (treaties) and secondary (regulations,
directives and decisions) European law (Crawford 2000a and b). In 1991, a
series of regulations elevated democracy promotion as an overarching
objective of foreign aid, not only for the EC but also for EU memberCARLOS S ANTISO
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states.
7 These different documents outline a ‘positive approach’ of support
and inducement with the allocation of incentive financing to encourage
democratisation. Yet they warned that appropriate measures will be taken
‘in the event of grave and persistent human rights violations or the serious
interruption of democratic processes,’ which could lead to the partial or
complete suspension of cooperation agreements. They also mandated the
Commission to insert democracy clauses in all future cooperation
agreements with third countries. Such clauses were introduced in 1992 and
now apply to over 120 countries. They were articulated on the basis of
‘essential elements’ with an associated ‘suspension’ or ‘non-performance
clause’ designed to redress the non-observance of the ‘essential elements’.
8
The Council approved a model clause in May 1995.
9 However, its
application has been uneven (Crawford 1998).
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty for the first time codified development
cooperation as an autonomous policy field with specific objectives (Title
XVIII, articles 130 u through y), ‘constitutionalising’ development
cooperation as a ‘community policy’ under the purview of the EC and the
responsibility of the Commission (unlike the Common Foreign and
Security Policy which remains an inter-governmental cooperation within
the ‘second pillar’ of the EU). The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty reaffirms that
EC policy is to contribute to the ‘general objective to developing and
consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting
human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Title XX article 177.2). The
respect for democracy and human rights was thus made a general principle
of EC law, hence informing all of its activities.
Similarly, accession to and continued membership in the EU became
explicitly conditional upon the endorsement of and adherence to a
democratic system of government. Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU) reaffirms that the EU ‘is founded on the principles of liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the
rule of law, principles that are common to the Member States’. Article 7
                                                                
7 The Communication of the European Commission on Human Rights, Democracy and
Development Cooperation  of March 1991 and the subsequent Resolution of the
Council of Ministers (Development) on Human Rights, Democracy and Development
of November 1991.
8 The notion of ‘essential element’ has a legal status as a binding commitment whose
non-observance affects the validity of the agreement signed between the parties to it
and ultimately leads to its suspension.
9 COM(95)216 final.THE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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further stipulates that the ‘existence of a serious and persistent breach by a
Member State of principles mentioned in Article 6(1)’ may lead to the
suspension of certain membership rights.
10 The requests for membership
from the transitional democracies of East and Central Europe had called
for a codification of the democratic foundations of the EU. In June 1993,
the Copenhagen Summit of the European Council adopted economic and
political criteria for membership. These include the ‘stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect and
protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as
well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces
within the Union’.
11 A suspension clause was added by the 1997
Amsterdam Treaty (article 7), according to which membership rights could
be suspended, restricted or revoked in the event of a violation of one of the
Copenhagen principles. However, the treaty does not (yet) provide for the
expulsion of a member state receding into authoritarianism. Such a
provision may become necessary in the context of the enlargement of the
EU to fragile democracies, not only to prevent democratic regressions but
also to avoid double standards being applied to candidate countries and
current members.
The promotion and consolidation of democratic governance and the rule of
law also became a central plank of EU external relations, guiding the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Title V of the TEU, which
spells out the main objectives of CFSP, stipulates in its article 11.1 that
‘The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security
policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of
which shall be: […] to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of
law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ CFSP
                                                                
10 Furthermore, the Nice Summit in December 2000 officially proclaimed the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights.
11 According to article 7(iii) of the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European
Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993. The pre-accession agreements are also
based on the principle of the ‘acquis communautaire’, that is the adoption of the body
of law and policies previously adopted by the EU by the potential member. These rules
and regulations shape and restrict behaviour of candidate countries. It could be argued
that the possibility of EU membership provided a further impetus and strong incentive
for prospective member states, especially in East and Central Europe, to consolidate
democratic governance. Pre-accession cooperation agreements provide assistance to
those countries to meet the requirements of membership. Membership to the Council
of Europe is also conditional to the adherence and promotion of parliamentary
democracy.CARLOS S ANTISO
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remains, however, in the realm of traditional inter-governmental relations
and policy, thus defined by the European Council and according to the
unanimity rule.
In 1999, three major and intertwined events affected the management of
EC aid: the adoption of a firmer legal basis for democracy assistance, the
change of the Commission in March 1999, and the launching of a major
overhaul of the Commission’ external relations and foreign aid, with the
subsequent restructuring of its services.
In a complex turn of events, the Court of Justice contested the legal basis
for EC democracy aid in its ruling of 12 May 1998 (Case C-106/96) on an
injunction from the European Parliament concerning the lack of a proper
legal basis for certain EC programmes. This ruling led to the de facto
suspension of most democracy assistance programmes and the review of
all democracy assistance portfolios managed by the Commission. The
ruling criticised the Commission’s ‘internal administrative fragmentation’,
with unduly divided responsibility for democracy and human rights
matters across regional directorate generals, and a general lack of
transparency and accountability.
In response to this legal challenge, on 29 April 1999, the Council adopted
two regulations (975/1999 and 976/1999) that laid down the principles and
procedures for the implementation of development cooperation
programmes which aim at advancing democracy, enhancing the rule of
law, strengthening good governance and promoting human rights.
12 These
resolutions, known as the ‘human rights regulations’, provide the current
legal basis for all democratisation activities under the EIDHR. They
allocate €260 million for the period 1999-2004 for the ACP states and
€150 million for non-ACP states and establish the broad guidelines for
democracy assistance, concentrating on both the institutions of government
and the modes of governance. The activities covered include a wide range
of programmes and a broad template of instruments focusing on electoral
observation and assistance, good governance, the rule of law and the fight
against corruption, administrative accountability, the effective separation
of power, political participation in decision-making and political pluralism.
The resolutions also identify the promotion of democratic governance as a
mechanism for conflict prevention and post-conflict peace building
(articles 2.2 and 2.3.of Council Regulation 975/1999). They became
                                                                
12 Council Regulation (EC) No.975/1999 and Council Regulation (EC) No.976/1999
of 29 April 1999.THE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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effective on 11 May 1999 when the crisis of the European Commission
had already erupted.
Electoral Observation and Assistance
Electoral assistance constitutes the most visible form of EC democracy
assistance. Support to the monitoring of elections was the first area of
intervention by the EC. Over the course of the 1990s the EC undertook
and funded a great variety of electoral observation missions (EC 2000b).
However, the EC only gradually adopted strategic orientations to guide its
interventions in the electoral field. Only in 1998 did the EC start to equip
itself with the necessary operational guidelines. The Council decision on
EU policy on electoral observation of 1998 established criteria for
assessing the fairness and regularity of elections observed by the EU.
13 In
June of the same year, the Council adopted guidelines for electoral
observation and in June 1999 it adopted common criteria for the selection
of electoral observers.
Too often, the holding of elections has been approached as an ‘exit
strategy’ in crisis situations and post-conflict reconstruction.  The holding
of elections has been the main focus of international pressure, overlooking
wider dimensions of democracy. However, elections, although necessary,
do not suffice to install and consolidate democratic governance. As
Zacharia (1997:40) notes, ‘while it is easy to impose elections on a
country, it is more difficult to push constitutional liberalism on a society’.
More difficult yet is how to respond to democratic erosion and decay.
Accordingly, the types of interventions are progressively expanding,
moving from an exclusive focus on international observation to support to
domestic monitoring and more refined forms of assistance, such as, in
particular, assistance to the design of new electoral systems, constitutional
engineering, institutional reform and support to the administration of
elections by independent electoral commissions. Support to political
parties and the reform of party systems remains tentative, however, given
concerns over issues of national sovereignty.
In April 2000, the EC adopted a communication on electoral assistance
and observation (EC 2000b) which constituted the first thorough and
systematic review of its experience in this field. It recognises that ‘an ad
hoc approach no longer seems appropriate nor the best use of resources’
(3) and that there has been no consistency in the choice of budgetary
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instruments and legal frameworks. It recommends the adoption of a more
coherent and consistently applied policy and better coordination between
the Council, the Commission and the Parliament (which has been sending
its own observation missions). It suggests the establishment of a
permanent EU Electoral Unit within the Commission, responsible for the
coordination of electoral assistance and observation in third countries (in
particular with the authority to decide on the requests for EU participation
in electoral observation, which has often been used to legitimise dubious
elections). More fundamentally, it argues that support for electoral
processes be undertaken exclusively under the ‘first pillar’ of the EU, as a
community policy funded mainly by aid budgets and Chapter B7-70. It
also underlines that, while elections can be assessed in light of the 1998
guidelines, post-conflict and first-generation elections may require a more
flexible approach.
Crisis Mitigation and Conflict Prevention
The 1990s have been marked by recurrent crises of democratic
governance, which have destabilised politically fragile countries.
However, preventing conflict, impeding the corrosion of governance and
responding to the erosion of democracy represent daunting challenges for
aid policies. The standard strategies for promoting democracy and
governance, including governance conditionality, tend to become
ineffectual in crisis situations and can sometimes compound the problems.
Based on the human rights regulations, the EC approach to
democratisation and conflict management is further made explicit in the
Commission’s communication on conflict prevention of 11 April 2001 (EC
2001b), prolonging a series of other documents adopted since 1995 on the
role of development cooperation in conflict prevention and post-conflict
peace-building (EU 1995 and 1998; EC 1996b). This communication is the
Commission’s contribution to the  European Programme for Conflict
Prevention adopted at the European Council at Gothenburg in June 2001.
The Commission’s approach to democratisation and conflict prevention is
informed by the Council’s common positions of June 1997 on conflict
prevention and resolution (CEU 1997) and May 1998 on human rights,
democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance (CEU 1998),
both taken in the context of the CFSP.
Echoing the  DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development
Cooperation (OECD DAC 1997) the Commission considers that the main
contribution of development cooperation to conflict prevention andTHE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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management is to promote and strengthen ‘democratic structural stability.’
The DAC Guidelines define an environment of structural stability as one in
which there are ‘dynamic and representative social and political structures
capable of managing and resolving disputes without resort to violence’ (9).
For the Commission, ‘structural stability’ refers to a situation involving
sustainable economic development, a democratic political regime, viable
political structures and effective democratic institutions, stable social
conditions, with a capacity to manage change without resorting to violent
conflict. Societal reconciliation, democratisation and economic
reconstruction are seen as three mutually reinforcing dimensions of
sustainable peace, development and democracy.
The EC approach recognises the multifaceted links between post-conflict
peace-making and conflict prevention, as well as between relief,
rehabilitation and development (EC 1996a and b, 1998, and 2001b). The
1998 declaration of the Council on the Role of Development Cooperation
in Strengthening Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution
confirmed the initial approach adopted by the Commission (EU 1998).
The 2001 communication on conflict prevention proposes a two-pronged
strategy, distinguishing between long-term conflict prevention (‘projecting
stability’) and short-term conflict management (quick reaction). In
particular, it recognises that preventing the occurrence or recurrence of
conflict in ‘dysfunctional states’  (EC 1997:16) and ‘politically fragile
countries’ (ECDPM 1999) entails rebuilding ‘failed states’, strengthening
democratic institutions and improving governance systems. By providing
institutionalised mechanisms to resolve disputes and channel discontent
democratic institutions prevent crises of governance from escalating into
violent conflict. The promotion of democratic governance thus becomes an
important tool for preventing, managing and resolving political crisis and,
in extreme cases of political instability and uncertainty, violent conflict.
The Cairo Declaration and Plan of Action adopted at the first Africa-
Europe Summit in Egypt in April 2000 further linked the strengthening of
democratic governance and the rule of law to effective conflict prevention
and management in Sub-Saharan Africa. At their first ministerial meeting
in October 2001 in Brussels, Belgium, European and African ministers
agreed to establish an ‘early warning system’ to prevent conflict in Africa
based on indicators to measure tensions.
However, while it acknowledges the destabilising effects of the
disintegration of the state in conflict-ridden and war-prone countries, the
Commission’s approach fails to recognise that democratisation itself canCARLOS S ANTISO
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generate sources of conflict. In particular, hasty transitions towards
democracy and premature elections can destabilise fragile peace processes.
While democracy and modernisation generate political stability, the
process of democratising and modernising often breeds instability
(Mansfield and Snyder 1995; ICG 2001). In some extreme cases, it is
increasingly believed that benign authoritarianism may be preferable to
hollow and corrupt façade democracies.
It is increasingly recognised that democratisation processes are highly
volatile and political transitions unpredictable. Democratisation does not
follow a natural, orderly and linear sequence of positive and progressive
political transformation. More often than not, it is an irregular, erratic and
sometimes reversible process, taking place in highly fluid and volatile
environments. It can go backwards and sideways as much as forward. It
follows different paths and adopts varied paces. As Peter Burnell and Peter
Calvert (1999:7) stress, ‘Political liberalisation in the context of an
authoritarian regime does not necessarily issue in transition to democracy,
and transition does not invariably lead to democratic consolidation’.
Moreover, the resurgence of democracy since the late 1980s has not
produced a clear-cut division between democratic and non-democratic
countries, but rather a wide spectrum of semi-democratic or semi-
authoritarian regimes with an extensive ‘grey area’ in between (Olcott and
Ottaway 1999; Carothers 2000). Increasingly, democracy is used with
adjectives to capture the reality of ‘hybrid regimes’ struggling to
consolidate (Collier and Levitwky, 1997). New and restored democracies
can adopt many shapes and shades, between the two extremes illiberal and
liberal democracies (O’Donnell, 1994; Zakaria 1997), between
democraduras and dictablandas (O’Donnell et al 1986). Larry Diamond
(1999) has aptly described this grey area as a ‘twilight zone’ in what
Thomas Carothers (1997b) refers to an era of ‘democracy without
illusions’. There is indeed a pressing need to devise new categories for
capturing the many realities and the great variety of hybrid democracies
that have emerged since the late 1980s.
Ultimately, these considerations question the intellectually elegant
assumption of a linear ‘democratisation continuum,’ from authoritarianism
to liberal democracy. Some scholars have questioned the usefulness of the
very paradigm of democratic transition and consolidation to comprehend
the dynamics of democratisation and guide policy (Schedler 1998 and
2001; Carothers 1997, 2000 and 2002; Santiso 2001a). Rather than
evaluating particular situations along a democratisation continuum, policy-THE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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makers might want to focus instead on the wide template of democratising
regimes. Detecting when a country slips from crisis to conflict is
particularly tricky, as democratic erosion is often an accumulation of
insidious changes. In this ‘grey area’ between crisis and conflict traditional
development cooperation instruments are likely to become ineffectual to
prevent further erosion. Often, democratic regressions and crises of
governance lead to the suspension of EC development assistance, thus
neutralising its ability to ‘project stability.’
Strengthening Governance and Preventing Democratic Erosion
In terms of the quality of democratic governance, the nature of the political
regime of many democratising states is often ambiguous, lying somewhere
in between genuine democracy and overt autocracy. The rise of low
intensity and uncertain democracies represents significant analytical and
policy challenges for both policymakers and scholars (Carothers 1997,
1999 and 2000). Many new and restored democracies have ended up in an
uneasy stage of democratisation: while possessing the formal attributes of
democracy, the modes of governance tend to exhibit resilient autocratic
features.
At the conceptual level, these considerations question the international
community’s ability to assess the nature of democracy as well as the
trajectory of democratisation in specific countries. Assessing whether
semi-authoritarianism is a stable condition resulting from a blocked
transition, a temporary stage in gradual process, or a different trajectory to
democracy represents tremendous challenges. Evaluating the nature of
political dynamics is of critical importance for devising appropriate
assistance strategies. The concept of ‘politically fragile countries’
(ECDPM 1997 and 1999) encompasses a wide variety of situations, with
varying degrees of willingness and capacities to democratise.
14
The policy challenges are equally great. Dealing with ‘dysfunctional states’
(EC 1997a:16) requires a subtle dosage of both positive incentives and
negative measures. It entails assessing the extent to which leaders have the
political will to democratise and are genuinely committed to
democratisation. Promoting democratic governance in faltering
                                                                
14 These situations include: authoritarian governments neither committed to nor willing
to engage in democratisation; conflict-ridden states; post-conflict countries where the
government authority and state institutions have been destroyed (‘failed’ states);
democratising states facing political instability (‘politically-fragile’ states); and
democratising states endowed with weak government institutions (‘weak’ states).CARLOS S ANTISO
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democracies such as Zambia, Zimbabwe or Haiti often involves a difficult
choice between a confrontational approach and an accommodating
strategy, both unsatisfactory responses to crises of governance. The
challenge for the international donor community is then to devise
assistance strategies with the right mix of positive incentives and negative
measures built in long-term, coherent and consistent strategies.
The human rights regulations and the electoral assistance communication
do provide a template of instruments for promoting democratic governance
(answering the ‘what’ question). They do not, however, articulate an
operational strategy (answering the ‘how’ question). Nor do they provide
guidance on how to respond to democratic erosion and governance
regression. Recognising these shortcomings, the Council, in its conclusions
on the EU’s role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third
countries of 25 June 2001, requested the Commission to articulate an EU
Common Strategy in the area of human rights and democratisation.
15
3. Democracy Assistance and Governance Conditionality: Strategy
Dilemmas
There exist intricate tensions between positive and negative measures to
promote democratic governance. The overarching EC democracy
assistance strategy remains one of ‘constructive engagement’. Its overall
objective is encouraging political change and policy reform in a
constructive manner based on dialogue and partnership with governments.
However, while the principle of ownership of reform proposals for
sustaining reform and increasing the effectiveness of aid is now well
established (Santiso 2001b), the EC recognises that, in some cases, such a
genuine commitment to democratic governance and the rule of law may be
weak or lacking. Negative measures based on conditional approaches may
therefore be appropriate (EC 2001a).
Hence, while the principle of conditionality remains mainly unquestioned,
the ways in which it has been applied has spanned intense controversies.
The question thus becomes how conditionality can be best designed to
further democratisation. While punitive forms of political conditionality
have proved largely ineffective, new types of governance conditionality
based on incentive and selectivity could yield greater results.
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Punitive Political Conditionality
A particular type of democracy promotion strategy is conditioning aid on
the political objectives underpinning the aid relationship. However, the
notion and practice of political conditionality have spawned intense
controversy (Stokke 1995; Nelson and Eglington 1992, 1993; Burnell
1994). Defined as ‘a mutual arrangement by which a government takes, or
promises to take, certain policy actions, in support of which an
international financial institution or other agency will provide specified
amounts of financial assistance’ (Killick 1998:6), aid conditionality
represents an attempt to use aid as an incentive for reforming the policies
and institutions of developing countries. Two important features of
political conditionality are its  ex ante nature and punitive character:
predetermined conditions are set in advance to access development
financing and failure to met these precludes the disbursement of aid.
The failure of conditionality to attain its desired objectives and bring about
sustained economic and political development has been widely recognised.
Craig Burnside and David Dollar (1997) have found that there is no direct
relationship between aid flows and policy reform and Paul Collier
(1997:57) asserts that ‘aid has simply not brought reform’. This finding is
substantiated by a recent study on Sub Saharan African countries which
shows that aid cannot buy reform and that the conditionality attached to
adjustment loans did not successfully induce policy change (Devarajan, et
al. 2001). Catherine Gwin and Joan Nelson (1997:10) argue that ‘aid is
only effective in promoting growth in a good policy environment, and on
the whole, it has not succeeded in leveraging good policies’.
Conditionality cannot substitute or circumvent domestic ownership of and
commitment to reform. Furthermore, it can have perverse effects, as it
tends to undermine the domestic democratic processes by supplanting
public policy-making. Collier warns against the abuse of conditionality:
‘The extension of the practice of conditionality from the occasional
circumstances of crisis management to the continuous process of general
economic policy-making has implied a transfer of sovereignty which is not
only unprecedented but is often dysfunctional’ (Collier 1999:319).
Furthermore, the fungibility argument questions the extent to which aid
can contribute to its intended objectives. Aid is said to be fungible when
the marginal increase in public expenditure in response to an inflow of aid
is not always realised in the targeted area of public expenditure.  Aid tends
to free up budget resources, which can then be allocated to alternative
purposes. As a result, it becomes critical to assess and influence the qualityCARLOS S ANTISO
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overall government spending, rather than focus on sectoral spending. In
countries engaging in inter-state conflict such as Ethiopia and Eritrea in the
late 1990s, the issue of aid fungibility becomes particularly important.
Incentive Conditionality and Selectivity
Another type of indirect democracy assistance strategy is a ‘positive’ form
of political conditionality: aid selectivity, or what Nelson and Eglington
(1993) term ‘allocative conditionality’. This strategy aims to establish an
incentive mechanism which bases aid rewards on the direction of change,
rather that the perceived level of democracy (Nielson 1999:3). It
encompasses the selection of aid recipients according to the quality of
democratic governance. The objective of this system is to increase the
effectiveness of aid by concentrating it in those countries showing genuine
commitment to improving governance. Aid selectivity is a particular form
of  ex post conditionality, which establishes a positive link between aid
allocations and country performance.
It is now believed that the effect of aid on growth tends to increase with
the quality of policy. As a consequence, it is increasingly argued that aid
would be more effective if it were either more systematically targeted to
poor countries with sound economic reform programs or used to promote
good policies. The influential research by World Bank economists Craig
Burnside and David Dollar (1997, 1998) on the impact of aid, policy and
growth shows that aid has been highly successful in reducing poverty and
promoting growth in countries with sound economic management and
robust government institutions. These research findings, generated from
within the World Bank itself, have had a significant influence on
development cooperation policies. The World Bank’s influential report of
1998 Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't and Why recommended a
more systematic targeting of aid to poor countries with sound policies and
effective institutions.
However, the practice has often contradicted the evidence, suggesting that
political considerations remain important in determining aid flows,
especially for large donors and multilateral institutions. Research on aid
policy has found have found that there is no direct relationship between aid
flows and the quality of policy (Burnside and Dollar 1997) and that, in
general, donors have not effectively tailored their assistance to the specific
country and phase of the reform process (Devarajan et al. 2001). More,
better policies and improving performance too often lead to decreasing
levels of development aid (Collier and Dollar, 1998), sending the wrongTHE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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signal. Indeed, a recent study of EU aid towards ACP countries found that
the performance of a country in terms of political rights and civil liberties
plays only a minor role in the allocation of EC aid and factors such as the
degree of openness and human development play no significant role (Wolf
and Spoden 2000).
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, radical strategies of aid selectivity
are largely unavailable to the EC. As long as the reach of its development
aid remains global, the Commission cannot discriminate among aid
recipients. The principle of selectivity can only be applied to the scope and
amount of aid, not to its direction. Nevertheless, the ‘tranching’ of aid into
several components and the introduction of phased programming provide
alternative incentive mechanisms, but it remains unclear how the quality of
democratic governance will affect country aid allocations.
Aid selectivity and incentive conditionality are extremely difficult to
implement in practice, however. Selectivity-based approaches to political
conditionality, which Richard Youngs (2001) describes as ‘incentives
conditionality’, require establishing rigorous monitoring mechanisms to
assess the dynamics of democratisation and the direction of governance
reform. It is a permanent challenge to devise and apply consistent and
even-handed criteria to measure country performance in terms of
governance. In reality, there exist few countries that can be classified as
either good or bad performers. Most of them lie somewhere in between.
Individual country circumstances make judgmental approaches
inescapable. Despite recurrent efforts, especially since 1998, the
Commission has not yet established such an incentives-based mechanism
of governance conditionality.
The International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank may
provide a useful model, albeit with limited applicability to EC aid.  IDA,
which provides grant aid and subsidised lending to low-income countries,
amended its guidelines to better assess governance reform in recipient
countries and allocate its aid (Santiso 2000 and 2001b). In 1998, the 12
th
replenishment of the resources has introduced a performance-based
allocation system (IDA 1988 and 2001). Aid allocations now take into
account the efforts made to improve governance. The Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment  (CIPA) framework was expanded to take into
consideration (i) accountable and competent public institutions; (ii)
transparent economic and social policies and practices; (iii) a predictable
and stable legal framework; and (iv) participation by affected groups andCARLOS S ANTISO
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civil society. Furthermore, since 1999, the World Bank has started to
conduct Governance and Institutional Reviews (GIR).
More fundamentally, governance conditionality and selectivity strategies
beg the original concern that spurred the current shift in policies: how can
external agencies promote good governance, especially in poor performing
countries? After all, unsatisfactory performance is often associated with
unsound policies and weak institutions.
4. Preventing Conflict and Responding to Crisis: Implementation
Dilemmas
The EC is increasingly relying on incentive conditionality to complement
positive measures of direct support. The cooperation between the EU and
the ACP group of countries is often cited as a model of partnership for
development (von Meinjenfeldt et al. 1999; ECDPM 2001b). Since its
establishment in 1975, the model has been adapted and improved to
respond to new demands and changing environments. It is based on a
legally binding international agreement outlining the objectives, purpose
and mutual obligations of the cooperation. It is anchored in the principles
of dialogue, contractuality, stability and predictability, which form the
basis of the so-called ‘culture of Lomé’, after the name of the city where
the first four conventions were signed. The contractual commitments and
long-term goals enshrined in the successive five-year financial protocols to
the European Development Fund (EDF) have nevertheless been criticised
for creating an ‘entitlement mentality’ among aid recipients. Unlike
EIDHR resources, EDF resources are co-managed by the Commission and
ACP countries.
A central thrust of the successive EU-ACP agreements has been to
strengthen the political foundations of the development partnership
(Santiso 1999). The fourth Convention of Lomé signed for ten years in
1989 was revised in 1995 to incorporate in its article 5 democratic
principles, human rights, and the rule of law as ‘essential elements’ of the
partnership. Good governance was cited as an ‘objective’ of the
cooperation (article 5). Incentive financing of €80 million was earmarked
by the financial protocol to the 8
th EDF covering the period (1995-2000).
In tandem with the standard positive approach, the amended fourth
Convention of Lomé introduced elements of governance conditionality.
Article 366a, in line with the Council’s decision of May 1995, provided for
appropriate steps to be taken in the event of serious and persistent human
rights violations or interruptions in the democratic process. Non-THE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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compliance with the ‘essential elements’ of article 5 could lead to a
suspension of the cooperation, considered as ‘a measure of last resort.’ The
revised convention also allowed for de facto suspension owing to ‘special
circumstances’. It failed, however, to clearly define such circumstances,
thus giving a certain leeway to the EC in its use, in particular to ‘transpose’
foreign policy decisions under the ‘second pillar’ of the EU into
development aid policies.
The case of Cuba illustrates an important tension, if not contradiction, of
the EU-ACP framework, paralleling some of the controversies surrounding
the enlargement of the EU itself: while its members may flagrantly and
persistently violate democracy and human rights without risking expulsion
from the cooperation agreement, potential applicant states are to satisfy
strict entry requirements. In a complex turn of events, Cuba asked for
admission into the EU-ACP agreement in February 2000.
  When granting
Cuba observer status in June 1998, EU foreign ministers made clear that
Cuba would have to satisfy strict political conditions and respect the values
and principles underpinning EU-ACP cooperation adopted in 1992 and
made explicit in 1993 with the Copenhagen criteria. The ACP group
endorsed Cuba’s candidacy but the EU had strong reservations of EU
(except some countries such as Spain). Cuba and its supporters argued that
it was unfair the political conditions be applied to new members when
current members entered the agreement without being imposed political
conditions and that their track-record at upholding the political foundations
of the agreement has been, at best, frail.  La Havana ultimately declined to
go ahead with its application, refusing any EU efforts to interfere in its
domestic affairs. In April 2000 it withdrew its candidacy to become part of
the EU-ACP agreement but became the 78
th member of the ACP group in
December.
16 Meanwhile, an additional six pacific states acceded to the
Cotonou Convention.
Bringing the State Back in
Based on its experience in sub-Saharan Africa, the EC has increasingly
focused its attention to the strengthening of good governance and the rule
of law, especially in conflict-ridden countries. Progressively, a link is
being forged between conflict prevention and democratic governance. The
1997 EC  Green Paper  on the relations between the EU and the ACP
countries (EC 1997a) and the subsequent 1998 policy statements by the
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Commission and the Council  (EC 1998 CEU 1998) stressed the urgent
need to address state failure, strengthen governance institutions and
implement administrative reforms.
These new directions constitute a significant shift in policy with respect to
the traditional and quasi-exclusive focus on civil society. Commissioner
Poul Nielson was among those expressing concern that the
disproportionate focus on civil society might actually be undermining state
institutions in many fledging democracies. During the 1990s, the EC has
tended to avoid the state, circumventing it by strengthening non-state
actors and promoting decentralisation. However, the initial enthusiasm
towards civil society organisations appears to be receding: not all
organisations of society are as civil as they appear and not all ‘non
governmental organisations’ are as non-governmental as they claim. Their
representativeness, accountability and sustainability are often weak and in
many instances NGOs are highly politicised, as they have often replaced
opposition political parties as channels of dissent and discontent. It is
increasingly being recognised that for good governance to be enhanced, the
state must be not only reformed but also recast and strengthened (DFID
2000).
Structured Political Dialogue
Regular and structured political dialogue is intended to play a ‘pivotal role’
in the renewed partnership between the EU and the ACP countries
(ECDPM 2001a, b and c). The new ACP-EU agreement was adopted on 23
June 2000 in Cotonou, Benin, after 18 months of intense and arduous
negotiations starting in September 1998. Its duration has been extended to
20 years (2000-20), comparing for 10 years for the fourth Lomé
Convention and five years for the three previous Lomé Conventions.
Although the new convention outlines the general objectives of political
dialogue, it remains vague on its modalities and structure (Title II, articles
8 through 13). Title II states that ‘the Parties shall regularly engage in
comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue leading to
commitments on both sides’ (article 8.1) regarding ‘all questions of
common, general, regional or sub-regional interest’ (article 8.3). It shall
contribute to ‘peace, security and stability and promote a stable democratic
political environment’ and ‘encompass cooperation strategies as well as
global and sectoral policies’ (article 8.3). In particular, ‘the dialogue shall
encompass a regular assessment of the developments concerning the
respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and goodTHE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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governance’ (article 8.4). In terms of the modalities of political dialogue,
article 8.6 indicates that the dialogue ‘shall be conducted in a flexible
manner’, be ‘formal or informal’ and ‘conducted within and outside the
institutional framework, in the appropriate format and at the appropriate
level’.
Essential Elements, Consultation Procedure and Suspension Clause
The Cotonou Convention, building on the legacy of the fourth Lomé
Convention, adds elements of governance conditionality and aid selectivity
to the previous provisions on political conditionality. The inclusion of
good governance as an ‘essential element’ of the cooperation proved to be
the most contentious issue in the negotiations leading to the new
agreement, which now regulates the cooperation between the EU and 77
ACP countries (compared to the previously 71). The agreement covers a
twenty-year period (2000-20) and contains a clause allowing it to be
revised every five years. Covering each five-year period, a financial
protocol indicates the total resources that are available for the ACP through
the EDF. The 9
th EDF covers the 2000-2005 period and represents €15.2
billion (to which approximately €10 billion from previous EDF must be
added).
The new agreement provides a stronger political foundation. Articles 9 and
96 replicate the provisions on the ‘essential elements’ and the ‘suspension
clause’ contained in the previous agreement (article 5 and 366a,
respectively). A major innovation lies in a mutual commitment to good
governance defined as ‘the transparent and accountable management of
human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purpose of
equitable and sustainable development’ (article 9.3). The inclusion of good
governance into the agreement proved to be a contentious and
controversial issue. Disagreements over democracy and good governance
also marked the first EU-Africa summit, which was held in April 2000 in
Cairo, Egypt.
As a compromise solution, the EU and the ACP agreed to include good
governance as a ‘fundamental element’ of the partnership, subject to
regular monitoring. The commitment to good governance does not posses
the legally binding nature of the essential elements and failure to uphold it
would not lead automatically to the initiation of the suspension mechanism
enshrined in the convention. Nevertheless serious cases of corruption,
including bribery, are now grounds for suspending the cooperation. Article
97 sets a specific consultation procedure to deal with such cases. TheCARLOS S ANTISO
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pervasive corruption in the health sector in Côte d’Ivoire in 1998, heavily
financed by the EC, obliged the EC to partially suspend its aid to the
country anyway. These events played an important role in the discussions
over the new ‘anti-corruption clause’.
Peace-building policies and conflict prevention and resolution are also
dealt with in the convention. The principles of article 11 and the provisions
of article 8 provide for political dialogue as a means to prevent conflict and
its recurrence in ACP countries. The stated objective of structured political
dialogue is to provide for a mechanism to prevent crisis of governance
from escalating into armed conflict and the breakdown of the
democratisation process. When article 96 is nevertheless applied, the
consultation process enables the EU to influence the course of events.
Articles 9 and 33 also include positive measures for promoting human
rights, strengthening democratic governance and consolidating the rule of
law, including support for political, institutional, and legal reforms, the
fight against corruption, assisting the reform of the state and the
modernisation of the public sector, promoting political, administrative and
financial decentralisation; and building capacity of non-state actors.
The new convention provides for a consultation mechanism in the event of
a serious breach of the terms of the agreement (articles 96 and 97). The
consultation procedure constitutes an important ‘signalling instrument’
through which the EC can respond to regressions or interruptions of the
democratisation process, persistent violations of human rights, and
endemic corruption. The party accused of violating the founding principles
of the convention is invited to hold consultation with the Commission ‘at
the level and in the form considered most appropriate for finding a
solution’ (article 96.2.a) and ‘the consultations shall begin no later than 15
days after the invitation and shall continue for a period established by
mutual agreement’, but shall not last longer than 60 days. The article states
that:
if the consultation do not lead to a solution acceptable to both
Parties, if consultation is refused, or in cases of special
urgency, appropriate measures may be taken. These measures
shall be revoked as soon as the reasons for taking them have
disappeared (article 96.2.a).
Article 96.2 (a and b) also allows for the ‘special urgency’ procedure of
the previous convention.THE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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However, the consultation procedure remains largely unregulated and the
‘appropriate measures’ to the discretion of the EC. While this uncertainty
provides for flexibility, it can and does also generate misunderstandings
and frictions, between the EC and the development partners, and within
the EU itself, as illustrated by the disagreement between France and the
Commission during the Fall of 2001 over the resumption of aid to the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). More fundamentally, the process
by which a country qualifies, disqualifies and re-qualifies for EC support
remains to be specified. Once a country has been sanctioned, there must be
greater clarity on how it will re-qualify and how the rehabilitation process
will unfold.
Country Strategies and Performance Reviews
Another innovation of the Cotonou Convention is the reform of aid
programming, with the introduction of performance-based management,
the simplification of instruments, and rolling programming. Cooperation
instruments have been reduced from ten to two, a grant facility and an
investment facility. The agreement also marks the end of ‘aid entitlements’
according to which countries were allocated fixed and locked amounts of
aid regardless of their performance. It thus allows more flexibility in the
use of EDF resources by introducing a performance-based allocation
system within a broader country strategy. An assessment mechanism, the
contours of which have yet to be defined, shall regularly adjust aid flows
in light of performance through a system of rolling programming (EC
2001d).
The EC is also improving its strategic planning: rolling programming and
performance reviews will allow to modify the volume of resources
allocated in response to evolving needs and performance. A single Country
Support Strategy (CSS) is to guide the programming process for each ACP
country, based on the country’s own development strategy. A flexible
strategic performance review mechanism has been established, allowing to
reviewing progress and regularly up-dating the CSS (every two years and a
half). In the context of the 9
th EDF, performance reviews are to be
undertaken in 2003 and 2005. Furthermore, the introduction of a system of
rolling programming entails conducting an annual operation review which
will assess performance and may modify allocations accordingly, although
this will not affect the core, ‘base case’ element of aid allocations
(previously know as ‘programmable aid’ or ‘structural adjustment
assistance’). Provisions for a ‘high case’ element in aid allocations are toCARLOS S ANTISO
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be used to reward particularly well performing countries in anticipation of
the regular performance reviews (EC 2000f).
As noted above, the introduction of country strategies constitutes a
positive, yet ambitious, development in the management of EC aid. If well
conducted, it will significantly enhance the coherence and consistency of
aid strategies. However, ‘the devil is in the details’ and the main challenge
resides in implementing these demanding provisions, in particular in how
considerations over the quality of democratic governance will be integrated
and monitored. As of December 2001, CSS have been formulated for 50
ACP countries, representing 80% of the programmable resources, 37 of
which have been processed by the Commission’s Quality Support Group
(ECDPM 2001c).
There is now greater convergence in the approaches of the EC and the IFIs
in terms of performance-based aid management. The Commission’s
endorsement of country strategic frameworks echoes the World Bank’s
approach, including in terms of contents. This alignment is reflected for
instance in the EC strategy for poverty reduction, which has become the
overarching objective of EC development policy (CEU 2001). It is stated
that the PRSPs and, where applicable, the Comprehensive Development
Framework (CDF) are to progressively become the main foundations of
Commission country strategies, especially for countries eligible for debt
relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. In a
working paper to operationalise the poverty reduction objective, the
Commission stated that ‘from the beginning of the development of the
PRSP concept, the European Commission has committed itself to this
process and will link aid programming to the PRSPs in the concerned
countries’ (EC 2001d:6). The guidelines for the 9
th EDF programming
process stress that, in the case of countries eligible for concessional
lending by the International Development Association (IDA), ‘the
CDF/PRSP will normally be the automatic point of departure for all
programming activities’ (EC 2000f:7).
17 In recent years, the World Bank
has amended its operational guidelines to give good governance greater
importance in adjustment and investment lending operations (Kapur and
Webb 2000; Santiso 2000a, b and c, and 2001b). The Bank’s Country
Assistance Strategies (CAS) and the World Bank/IMF Poverty Reduction
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Strategy Papers (PRSP) now integrate considerations over the quality of
governance and, since 1999, the Bank has been conducting  Institutional
and Governance Reviews (IGR).
However, the increasing alignment of the EC with the approach of the
international financial institutions (IFIs) introduces tensions between the
political thrust of EC aid and the apolitical approach of the IFIs. The
apolitical mandate of the IFIs may not be compatible with the explicitly
political objectives of EC aid and the centrality accorded to political
dialogue. The objectives of EC aid in any particular country are broader
than those of the IFIs and one of its defining characteristics are precisely
its political dimensions. These tensions surfaced in the recent review of the
poverty reduction strategies organised by the IMF and the World Bank in
January 2002 (IMF 2002). As the World Bank and the IMF are to embark
on debt relief for conflict-affected HIPC-eligible countries, this tension is
likely to gain greater prominence. For instance, the Commission
emphasises that debt relief should be conditional on governance
performance and enhanced commitment to strengthen democratic
governance and that it could be suspended in cases of democratic
regressions or breakdowns (Nielson 2000). However, conditions for debt
relief are limited to economic reform and a relatively narrow range of
good governance issues.
The EC has mainly been a ‘follower’ in the process of the redefinition of
aid strategies and governance conditionality since the late 1990s. In 2000,
it contributed €1 billion of unspent funds to HIPC Trust Fund and
increasingly adopts PRSP but is hardly involved in the articulation of
policy guidelines and the design of their strategy, leaving the EC ‘trailing
in the wake of the Fund and the Bank’ (Nielson 2000). The stated
objectives of EC aid thus run the risk of being diluted, especially those
concerning the political dimensions of EC aid. The specific character and
identity of EC aid lies precisely in its political approach to development
cooperation.
Democracy and Governance Indicators
A further challenge for the EC has been how to operationalise governance
conditionality in a consistent manner. In a communication in 1998, the
Commission made an attempt at clarifying the main components of the
‘essential elements’ of the Convention of Lomé (EC 1998). This
communication was subsequently complemented by an analyticalCARLOS S ANTISO
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framework suggesting an assessment method and a series of performance
indicators.
A particularly thorny issue has been the definition of performance
indicators of democracy and governance. To uphold the common
objectives of the development partnership, the EC is increasingly relying
on indicators of country’s performance, although it warns against their
mechanistic use and to avoid double standards (EC 2001a). The question
of the appropriate indicators of democracy and governance constituted
stumbling blocks in the recent negotiations between the EU and the ACP
group (1998-2000) on a successor agreement to the Lomé Convention
(Santiso 1999).
Substantial research and unreasonable resources are being devoted to the
issue. A worrying phenomenon has been the tendency towards using and
even abusing quantitative indicators and abstract to evaluate the
performance of external assistance to democracy and good governance.
Democracy and good governance do not easily lend themselves to
quantifiable indicators (Schmitter and Brouwer. 1999). Qualitative ones
must therefore complement quantitative indicators.
A number of donors, and in particular the World Bank Institute (WBI) and
the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID),
have also elaborated their own conceptual frameworks to assess
democracy and governance, guidelines for the identification of appropriate
indicators and more recently extensive handbooks containing indicators to
assist managers in the selection of indicators.
18 This has led to a multitude
of sometimes-conflicting indicators of progress and performance. The
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has been investigating the
feasibility of monitoring and evaluating programmes promoting
participatory development and good governance but has failed, so far, to
reach a consensus on the issue.
Less attention has been given, however, to the manner in which
performance indicators are identified, specified and monitored. The
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process by which quantitative and qualitative indicators are defined greatly
influences their legitimacy and thus their operationality (Santiso 1999;
ECDPM 2000). The method is as important as the indicators themselves.
This implies establishing a clear and agreed-upon framework to assess
democratic governance (assessment criteria), measure progress in
democratisation and good governance (performance indicators), and
evaluate the impact of the interventions by the international community on
these processes of change (evaluation criteria and impact indicators).
Case Studies
The political dimensions of EC development cooperation are most visible
in the way political dialogue is conducted and the instance in which aid is
suspended for political reasons. However, the mechanisms for political
dialogue, consultation and aid suspension still need to be tested to ascertain
their impact. There exist only few systematic studies on the application of
the suspension mechanism (Crawford 1998; da Câmara and Sherrif 2001).
Suspension of aid for non-respect of democratic principles and interruption
of the democratic occurred in 11 cases, including Niger, Sierra Leone,
Togo, Cameroon, Haiti, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Liberia and more
recently Zimbabwe. Aid was also  de facto suspended in countries in
conflict such as Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC.
The cases hereafter under review are Niger, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, and Fiji.
They exclusively focus on instances where the consultation and suspension
mechanisms of the last two EU-ACP agreements have been resorted to.
They reflect common shortcomings in the management of political
dialogue and the suspension mechanism in the three stages of the
suspension process: at its inception (consultation procedure),
implementation (suspension of aid) and conclusion (resumption of aid).
They also reveal a learning curve, in particular in the way in which the
consultations are conducted, as the EC has gradually incorporated the
lessons from experience, albeit mainly in an ad hoc manner.
Niger. These first recourses to the new mechanisms of the convention
reflected a certain improvisation as a consequence of the imprecision of the
legal bases and the vagueness of the procedures. In January 1996, a
military coup led by Colonel Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara overthrew the first
democratically elected government in Niger. The coup happened in a
context of a profound crisis of governance resulting from the stand-off
between the President and the Parliament over the nomination of the Prime
Minister. The Council decided, by unanimity, to suspend its developmentCARLOS S ANTISO
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cooperation under the basis of article 366a of the fourth Convention of
Lomé (Koulaïmah-Gabriel 1998). Humanitarian aid and aid benefiting the
poor were excluded from the decision. This is the first time article 366a
had been used but the EC resorted to the ‘special urgency’ clause to
immediately suspend Niger on the grounds of a sudden and abrupt
interruption of the democratisation process.
During the decision-making process leading to the suspension there was a
lack of clarity as to the majority required to suspend cooperation (qualified
majority or unanimity). Given that the decision had been adopted by
unanimity, the veto of a single EU member state could thus oppose the
continuation of the suspension. Furthermore, the period of suspension was
established at 6 months, after which a new decision must be taken to
prolong the suspension. In the absence of such a decision, cooperation
could resume. That is precisely what happened as France vetoed the re-
conduction of the suspension in July 1996.
Baré won the highly contested presidential elections of July 1996 and the
opposition boycotted the subsequent legislative elections of November.
However, the political crisis continued and democracy further eroded.
Following a gentlemen’s agreement in July 1998, highly contested local
elections were held in February 1999 and subsequently annulled by the
Supreme Court in early April. On 9 April, President Baré was murdered by
his own presidential guard in a bloody military coup lead by General
Wanké. The Parliament was suspended and replaced by a National
Reconciliation Council, which promised to hold elections in the following
9 months, by 31 December 1999.
The EC suspended, once again, its cooperation on the basis of ‘special
urgency’ and invited the de facto authorities to initiate consultations. These
were conducted in May and June 1999 and concluded on 29 July. A
transition calendar was agreed upon, leading to the adoption of a new
constitution by referendum in July and the holding of presidential and
legislative elections in October and November under the supervision of an
independent electoral commission. Tandja Mamadou was elected
President. The EC resumed its cooperation gradually as progress in the
transitional process was observed.
Haiti. Cooperation with Haiti has also been particularly difficult since the
restoration of democracy in 1994. The Haitian case constitutes a dramatic
illustration of the difficulties of cooperating with dysfunctional
democracies and failed states. Since June 1997, Haiti has been in a state ofTHE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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institutional paralysis, experiencing democratic decay and recurrent crises
of governance.
Following several postponements, the first round of the general election
was held in May 2000. However, in June, the Organisation of American
States (OAS), which had been observing the elections, declared the results
of the senatorial elections flawed and called on the Provisional Electoral
Council (CEP) to address these shortcomings and adhere strictly to the
provisions of the electoral law in the second round. The Haitian authorities
interpreted this injunction as ‘interference’ and pressured the CEP to
proclaim the results as they stood. On 18 June, under intense pressures,
two of the CEP’s nine members resigned and its chairman fled to the
United States. The remaining six members officially announced the results,
unchanged, provoking an outcry within the international donor community.
On 7 July, the OAS Electoral Observation Mission announced that it would
not be observing the second round because the results adopted by the CEP
were ‘incorrect’. The second round was nevertheless conducted on 9 July.
On 25 July, the Commission asked the Council to initiate consultation with
Haiti under article 366a.
19 Nevertheless, presidential and senatorial
elections were held on 26 November, resulting in the re-election of former
president Jean Bertrand Aristide. These elections were preceded by a wave
of violence and intimidation of the opposition. The EU deplored the
unwillingness of Haitian authorities to establish a genuinely independent
electoral commission and resolve the disputes arising from the May
elections. Ultimately on 31 January 2001, the EC, exasperated, suspended
its much-needed cooperation (including the second ‘tranche’ of the
National Indicative Programme of the 8
th FED, amounting to €44.4 million
and direct budgetary aid). The country further slipped into crisis, with a
series of failed attempted coups d’état in July and December 2001.
Relations between the EC and the government of Haiti are now marked by
acrimony and mutual distrust and dislike.
Côte d’Ivoire. The way the consultation process was conducted in the case
of Côte d’Ivoire in 2000 was more rigorous and was able to influence the
political situation to a certain extent. Ultimately, however, EC pressure
was not enough. On 22-23 December 1999, long-time President Kona
Bedié was deposed by a military coup led by General Robert Guéi. Since
its independence, Côte d’Ivoire had been one of the most stable nascent
democracies of the continent. The constitution was suspended and
                                                                
19 COM(2000)486 final.CARLOS S ANTISO
40
democratic institutions dissolved (including the National Assembly, the
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court). A National Committee of
Public Safety was established to restore the authority of the state and to
‘create the conditions necessary for the restoration of democracy and the
organization of free, fair and transparent elections’. The coup was
unanimously condemned (including, in particular, by France, the United
Kingdom and the United States).
Following a communication by the Commission on 7 January 2000,
20 the
Council opened consultations with Côte d’Ivoire on 14 January on the
basis of articles 5 and 366a of the Convention of Lomé. These
consultations took place on 7 February. The de facto authorities in Côte
d’Ivoire pledged to restore democracy and agreed to an electoral timetable
leading to the holding of presidential, legislative and local elections by 31
October 2000 at the latest. The Council, in its decision concluding the
consultations of 2 May 2000 decided not to suspend cooperation but to
adopt ‘appropriate steps’ including ‘the pursuit of cooperation on a gradual
and conditional basis, focusing during the transition period on measures in
support of the rapid and full restoration of constitutional democracy, the
rule of law, good governance and civil society, and, should the need arise,
humanitarian aid’ (3).
21 The Commission would monitor compliance with
the electoral timetable and the adoption of measures to guarantee the
impartiality and credibility of the elections in October.
The October elections were supposed to bring a relatively smooth
restoration of democracy, but things went terribly wrong. In July, a new
constitution was adopted and approved by referendum but controversies
regarding electoral and citizenship laws tainted the electoral process. The
Supreme Court told the two most popular opposition parties that they could
not present candidates and Alassane Ouattara, a former Prime Minister,
was excluded from the race on the grounds of its contested nationality. It
progressively became clear that General Guéi would not allow free and fair
elections and wanted to retain power. The EC consequently suspended its
electoral assistance. Ultimately General Guei was forced out of office by
protests in October following his refusal to step down despite losing the
elections to Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the oldest opposition party, the
Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI).
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On 22 January 2001 the EC invited Côte d’Ivoire for another round of
consultations, which took place on 15 February. Open and transparent local
elections were held in 25 March. On 29 May, the Commission proposed to
conclude the consultation procedure and resume aid on a ‘gradual and
phased’ basis, focusing in particular on institutional support. On 25 June
the Council decided to gradually restore cooperation with Côte d’Ivoire to
accompany the positive developments. However, the EC called on the
launching of a national and multiparty dialogue, national reconciliation and
the opening of legal proceedings concerning human rights abuses. The
resumption of full cooperation will depend on the progress achieved,
pending a further review in January 2002.
Fiji. The case of Fiji constitutes a dramatic irony of history. Originally, the
EU and the ACP group had planned to sign the successor agreement to the
fourth Lomé Convention in Suva, the capital of Fiji, on 31 May 2000. The
objective was to give a new start to the EU-ACP cooperation by distancing
it from Lomé, the capital of Togo, a country with which the cooperation
had been suspended on political grounds on-and-off since 1996. However,
just two weeks prior to the signing conference, a coup, which ultimately
failed, was attempted, interrupting the democratisation process in the
ethnically-divided island state of the Pacific.
On 19 May 2000, a group of armed men stormed the Parliament, taking
hostage its members, the Prime Minister and 40 members of the
government. The group led by George Speight demanded a decisive
governmental role for ethnic Fijians, who make up 51% of Fiji’s
population. The President, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, was obliged to remove
the democratically elected government of the ethnic-Indian Prime Minister
Mahendra Chaudhry, as it was no longer in the position to perform its
functions. On 29 May, the head of the army, Commodore Frank
Bainiramara, with the consent of the President who stepped aside, assumed
executive power and repealed the 1997 multi-ethnic Constitution. On 6
June, the military government outlined a plan to restore civil order, which
appeared to accede to the demands of the coup plotters for the restoration
of the supremacy of ethnic-Fijians in government.
The armed insurrection was immediately condemned by the Presidency of
the EU. On 4 August, on the basis of a communication by the Commission
to the Council,
22 the EU invited the  de facto government of Fiji for
consultations under articles 9 and 96 of the Cotonou Convention. The
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consultations were held on 19 October. While deploring the interruption of
the democratic process, the EU noted the commitments made by Fiji’s
interim government, including a timetable for constitutional review, the
holding of democratic elections within 18 months, and the bringing to
justice of the coup plotters.
The Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, decided to
conclude the consultations on 4 April 2001.
23 It adopted a series of
‘appropriate measures’, taking into consideration recent positive
developments, including the judgement by the Fijian Court of Appeal in
March stating that the 1997 Constitution remains the supreme law of Fiji
and the announcement of elections in August and September 2001. The
Council opted for a step-by-step approach, identifying four benchmarks,
which included the multi-racial contents of the constitution (by the end of
June 2001), the adoption and promulgation of a new constitution (not later
than the end of December 2001), the holding of general, free, and fair
elections (not later than the end of June 2002), and the initiation of
judiciary procedures against George Speight and his associates.
Nevertheless, the Council suspended all investment projects under the 6
th,
7
th, and 8
th EDFs and delayed the adoption of the 9
th EDF until free and fair
elections were held and a legitimate government had assumed office. New
aid commitments would be conditioned upon the progress made towards
the restoration of democracy, as assessed by compliance with the
benchmarks. The Council would revoke these measures when democracy
was fully restored.
Tensions between ethnic Fijians and ethnic Indians continued to escalate,
however. Traditional chiefs gathered to find a peaceful resolution to the
stand-off and appointed Josefa Iloilo, a candidate favoured by the rebel
leader, to the presidency. In July, the EU threatened to tighten its sanctions.
In late August-September 2001, parliamentary elections were held and
judged relatively free and fair by international observers. Mr Chaudhry’s
party won 27 out of 71 parliamentary seats, while Mr Qarase’s nationalist
Fijian People’s Party (SDL) won 31, failing to secure an outright majority.
However, and despite the provisions of the 1997 Constitution, Prime
Minister Qarase excluded Mr Chaudhry’s party from the coalition
government he formed in September, with the blessing of President Iloilo.
In October 2001, Fiji’s new Parliament was sworn in, but Ethnic tensions
between ethnic-Fijians and ethnic-Indians did not recede. The situation
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remains fluid, making it particularly difficult to assess the real quality of
Fiji’s ‘restored democracy.’
These four cases illustrate the difficulties of conducting political dialogue
in a consistent and systematic manner. They clearly demonstrate that the
operational mechanisms within the Commission to manage these
instruments have not been sufficiently clarified. They also indicate that
there is only a narrow range of circumstances in which the consultation
procedure of the suspension mechanism can be invoked, mainly
interruptions of the democratisation process. Civil conflicts, however, have
been responded to under the CFSP.
Furthermore, once development aid has been suspended to a country, the
process by which this country could re-qualify to foreign aid remains
unspecified, although important improvements have been made since
1996. Article 96 of the Convention of Cotonou stipulates that any measure
shall be revoked as soon as the reasons for taking it have disappeared.
However, how, when and by whom such a judgement will be made are not
made explicit. It is urgent to clarify these grey areas in the conduct of
political dialogue and the application of the suspension mechanism, as
democratic erosions tend to become more frequent.
Experience suggests, in particular, that the consultation and suspension
mechanism is more effective in responding to cases of breakdown of
democracy, such as coup d’états (Côte d’Ivoire or Fiji), than flawed
elections (Togo or Haiti). In the former, the de facto authorities seek to
legitimise their rule by agreeing on a calendar for the return to
constitutional rule, which can be aptly accompanied by the EC’s incentive
measures. In the latter cases, such as Zimbabwe, the semi-authoritarian
regime resists and resents having its legitimacy contested by outside actors.
The increasing acrimony and confrontation between the regime and the EU
make it particularly difficult to apply a positive approach of support and
inducement as long as the autocratic leaders remain in power. For instance,
President Eyadéma of Togo has never recognised the electoral fraud in
1992. His reluctance to abide by free and fair elections was confirmed in
1998. Negative measures and aid sanctions tend to be the only available
recourse, until the regime credibly re-commits itself to return to the
democratisation path. For these reasons, credible international observation
of elections is critical to assess the regime’s autocratic tendencies.
However, the legitimacy of European electoral observation is often
criticised as undue interference in domestic affairs. On 29 October 2001,
the Council decided to launch the consultation provided for by article 96 ofCARLOS S ANTISO
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the Cotonou Convention vis-à-vis Zimbabwe, after months of stalemate
over political violence and the deterioration of the rule of law ahead of
next presidential election in March 2002. Exasperated at the expulsion of
the Head of its Electoral Observation Mission, Pierre Schori, the EU
imposed ‘smart sanctions’ on Zimbabwe’s ruling elite on 18 February
2002. The Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU),
Amara Essy, criticised the interference in domestic affairs that
international electoral observation represented, when foreign donors
impose this observation.
It becomes thus urgent to devise more legitimate processes of international
electoral observation, based on existing multilateral arrangements and
regional organisations. For instance, the United Nations could supervise
the creation of a system of international certification of domestic elections.
Regional organisations such as the OAU in Sub Saharan Africa, the
Organisation of American States (OAS) in Latin America and the
Caribbean and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) in Europe would be responsible for observing elections in their
respective areas of responsibility. Such mechanism would probably have
greater legitimacy, as it would include rather than the state where elections
are held.
6. Conclusions: The Learning Curve
The momentum of reform must be maintained. Clearly, while tremendous
progress has been made in recent years, EC democracy assistance policy
still lacks clarity, coherence, and consistency. Within the Commission
itself, responsibility for encouraging democracy abroad remains
fragmented and divided between several directorate generals, in particular
external relations, enlargement, and development assistance. The creation
of Europe Aid Cooperation Office may well enhance the management of
aid but may also further complicate the translation of broad policy goals
into consistent operational strategies.
24 Furthermore, tensions and
contradictions between the first and second pillars of European integration
still remain a stumbling block for the application of coherent democracy
assistance strategies and governance conditionalities.
                                                                
24 The Europe Aid Cooperation Office is structured in 7 directorates, 5 of which are
geographically defined. Each of the geographical  directorates has a  unit for ‘social
development and institutional support’, which include support to the rule of law and
good governance. The unit for democracy and human rights (F3)  is located in a
separate directorate (F).  THE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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Paradoxically, the current reform of external relations and development
cooperation tends to ‘depoliticise’ foreign aid, converting it essentially as a
technical activity to be evaluated in terms of the efficiency of aid delivery
and the quality of aid programmes, rather than their political thrust. Indeed,
the directorate general for external relations, where a Unit for Conflict
Prevention, Crisis Management and ACP Political Issues (Directorate A/4)
as well as a Unit for Human Rights and Democratisation have been
established (Directorate B/1), has become the main focal point for
democracy promotion. However, long-term democracy assistance work
more often takes places within the realm of development cooperation. The
short time-scale of diplomacy and the long-term objectives development
cooperation may not always be compatible, and as Clare Short suggests,
there may often be a ‘clash between the perspective of foreign affairs
ministers and development ministers’.
25
The examination of democracy and governance assistance underscores the
need to integrate external relations and development cooperation more
systematically. It questions the current segmentation in two directorate-
generals. The directorate-general for development is exclusively entrusted
with the management of this cooperation. It is significant that there does
not exist a specialised horizontal unit within the directorate-general for
development responsible for democracy and governance assistance. The
unlinking of the political dimensions of the EU-ACP partnership from the
management of EDF resources that this structure appears to suggest may
prove particularly counter-productive. Furthermore, foreign policy remains
firmly anchored in the inter-governmental pillar of CFSP. As a result, the
division of labour between the directorate-generals for external relations
and development remains blurred regarding their respective responsibilities
in the promotion of democracy and strengthening of governance in
developing countries.
At the operational level, there remain many thorny process issues. The new
system of performance-based programming is likely to be more demanding
than ever and the EC delegations are likely to bear the heaviest burden.
Conducting structured political dialogue and organising broadly based
consultations will inevitably prolong programming. Although this may
ultimately increase the effectiveness of aid, the articulation of country
strategies, the monitoring of government performance and the regular
                                                                
25 Quoted in the Ninth Report on International Development of the International
Development Committee of the United Kingdom’s House of Commons, 27 July 2000
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review of the quality of democratic governance are particularly challenging
endeavours requiring sustained efforts and specialised skills. How these
assessments will affect the newly established performance-based allocation
system remains unclear, in particular regarding on how adjustment will be
made in country allocations as well as between countries.
The following proposals could be considered.
§  At the strategy level, strategic planning in the area of democracy and
governance assistance should be strengthened, ideally within  the
directorate general for development by expanding the responsibilities of
the existing Directorate A (A/1). This strategic planning department
would support delegations in the design of country assistance strategies
and ensure the consistent application of policy guidelines.
§  The establishment of a  democracy and governance unit should be
seriously considered. This unit would be responsible for assessing
policies and revising strategies. Ideally, a Commission-wide mechanism
should be established to supervise democracy promotion initiatives,
including the respect of the democracy clauses enshrined in the
cooperation agreements with third countries since 1995. This unit would
capitalise the Commission’s recent experience with political dialogue
and aid suspension and should become the focal point for supervising
political dialogue, coordinating the consultation process and guiding the
suspension mechanism across countries. It would provide critical
institutional support to the country Delegations, which remain the central
locus for conducting political dialogue in specific countries, as each case
is unique. Such a set-up would be particularly useful in the context of the
deconcentration towards Delegations. It shall be responsible for
articulating methods to assess democratic governance and identify
corresponding performance indicators to monitor progress or detect
regress. Furthermore, the establishment of such a unit will allow for a
more strategic use of EIDHR resources, in particular in cases where
official aid has been suspended (EC 2001a). In such cases, EIDHR
resources, which are not affected by the suspension and whose
disbursement depends on a unilateral decision by the Commission,
should be better targeted to promote political dialogue within the country
to mitigate crises of governance and prevent conflict.
The Governance and Institutions Department of the British Department
for International Development (DFID) and its Governance Advisory
Group constitutes a promising model to mainstream governanceTHE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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concerns in regional and country operations.
26 It combines  a central
departmental unit responsible for designing governance policies and
ensuring consistency in its application,  with a decentralised group of
associated experts advising field offices on the articulation of country
strategies and operational programmes.
§  The  policy research and evaluation capabilities of EC should be
dramatically enhanced to assess the effectiveness of aid strategies and
develop an autonomous voice in the global aid regime. The EC aid
apparatus still lacks the research capacities of institutions such as the
World Bank and thus encounters difficulties in setting its own agenda
and having its voice heard in multilateral forums. The need for more
coherent aid policies and strategies should not lead the EC to adopt the
IFIs agenda, but rather to influence it and challenge it. In particular, and
unlike the IFIs, the identity of EC aid is founded on its distinctively
political character and approach. Challenging the intellectual monopoly
of the IFIs on aid polices and the predominance of economic approaches
to development will require the EC to enhance its credibility as an
innovator and leader in development thinking.
In the current institutional set-up, the Evaluation Unit (Directorate H/6)
is now placed under the responsibility of the Board of  Europe Aid,
which appears to indicate that its main function will be the evaluation of
the efficiency of aid programmes, rather than the assessment of aid
strategies. The establishment of the Quality Support Group (QSG) is
evidence of the current efforts at enhancing the quality of programming,
but fails to address the central question of strategy and the translation of
general objectives into coherent policies and consistent programmes. A
first, but sub-optimal option, would be to expand the mandate of the
Evaluation Unit to encompass strategic evaluation. Alternatively, policy
research and strategic evaluation capabilities should be established
within the directorate general for development. Ideally, the EC could
establish a policy think-tank or specialised agency to advise the
Commission on democracy and governance issues.
§  In that context, a systematic review of the suspension mechanism
since 1995 should be conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the
consultation procedure under the EU-ACP cooperation framework.
                                                                
26 Other bilateral aid agencies have also created specialised, transversal policy units
responsible for coordinating their democracy and governance work. These include, for
instance, United States’ USAID, Canada’s CIDA, United Kingdom’s DFID,
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Political dialogue and the consultation process provided for by the
Cotonou Convention are likely to become the EU’s principal instrument
to deal with faltering democracies and crises of governance, what the
OECD DAC (2001a and b) terms ‘poor performers’ in the context of
elusive and difficult partnerships. It is thus essential to have a critical
look at how it can be improved to better manage these politically
sensitive processes.
The following proposals could be considered.
§  At the strategy level, strategic planning in the area of democracy and
governance assistance should be strengthened, ideally within the
directorate general for development by expanding the responsibilities of
the existing Directorate A (A/1). This strategic planning department
would support delegations in the design of country assistance strategies
and ensure the consistent application of policy guidelines. This
department would also be responsible for drafting the annual report on
EC development cooperation that has been suggested by the
Development Council in May 1999.
§  The establishment of a  democracy and governance unit should be
considered. This unit would be responsible for assessing the
effectiveness of existing policies and strategies. Ideally, a Commission-
wide mechanism should be established to supervise democracy
promotion initiatives, including the respect of the democracy clauses
enshrined in the cooperation agreements with third countries since 1995.
Alternatively, the unit could be incorporated into the directorate B for
transversal policies of the directorate general for development.
This unit would capitalise the Commission’s recent experience with
political dialogue and aid suspension and should become the focal point
for supervising political dialogue, coordinating the consultation process
and guiding the suspension mechanism across countries. It would
provide critical institutional support to the country Delegations, which
remain the central locus for conducting political dialogue in specific
countries, as each case is unique. Such a set-up would be particularly
useful in the context of the deconcentration towards Delegations. It shall
be responsible for articulating methods to assess democratic governance
and identify corresponding performance indicators to monitor progress
or detect regress.
Furthermore, the establishment of such a unit will allow for a more
strategic use of EIDHR resources, in particular in cases where officialTHE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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aid has been suspended (EC 2001a). In such cases, EIDHR resources,
which are not affected by the suspension, should be better targeted to
promote political dialogue within the country to mitigate crises of
governance and prevent conflict.
The Governance and Institutions Department of the British Department
for International Development (DFID) and its Governance Advisory
Group constitutes a promising model to mainstream governance
concerns in regional and country operations.
27 It combines both a central
departmental unit responsible for designing governance policies and
ensuring consistency in its application, as well as a decentralised group
of associated experts advising field offices on the articulation of country
strategies and operational programmes.
§  The  policy research and evaluation capabilities of EC should be
greatly enhanced to assess the effectiveness of aid strategies and develop
an autonomous voice in the global aid regime. In the current institutional
set-up, the Evaluation Unit (Directorate H/6) is now placed under the
responsibility of the Board of Europe Aid, which appears to indicate that
its main function will be the evaluation of the efficiency of aid
programmes, rather than the assessment of aid strategies. The
establishment of the Quality Support Group (QSG) is evidence of the
current efforts at enhancing the quality of programming,  but fails to
address the central question of strategy and the translation of general
objectives into coherent policies and consistent programmes. A first, but
sub-optimal option, would be to expand the mandate of the Evaluation
Unit to encompass strategic evaluation. Alternatively, policy research
and strategic evaluation capabilities should be established within the
directorate general for development. Ideally, the EC could establish a
policy think-tank or specialised agency to advise the Commission on
democracy and governance issues.
The EC aid apparatus still lacks the research capacities of institutions
such as the World Bank and thus encounters difficulties in setting its
own agenda and having its voice heard in multilateral forums. The need
for more coherent aid policies and strategies should not lead the EC to
adopt the IFIs agenda, but rather to influence it and challenge it. For
instance, the EC’s annual report on development assistance should
                                                                
27 Other bilateral aid agencies have also created specialised, transversal policy units
responsible for coordinating their democracy and governance work. These include, for
instance, United States’ USAID, Canada’s CIDA, United Kingdom’s DFID,
Germany’s BMZ, Sweden’s Sida and The Netherlands’ DGIS.CARLOS S ANTISO
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ultimately be comparable to the World Bank’s  World Development
Report  or UNDP’s  Human Development Report. Challenging the
intellectual monopoly of the IFIs on aid policies and the predominance
of economic approaches to development will require the EC to enhance
its credibility as an innovator and leader in development thinking. In
particular, and unlike the IFIs, the identity of EC aid is founded on its
distinctively political character and approach.
§  In that context, a  systematic review of the application of the
suspension mechanism since 1995 should be conducted to assess the
effectiveness of the consultation procedure under the EU-ACP
cooperation framework. Political dialogue and the consultation process
provided for by the Cotonou Convention are likely to become the EU’s
principal instrument to deal with faltering democracies and crises of
governance, what the OECD DAC (2001a and b) terms ‘poor
performers’ in the context of elusive and difficult partnerships. It is thus
essential to have a critical look at how it can be improved to better
manage these politically sensitive processes.THE R EFORM OF EU DEVELOPMENT P OLICY
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